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CHAPTER 1 
OVERVIEW 
In 1962, James C. Davies published an article in the 
American Sociological Review entitled "Toward a Theory of 
Revolution". In it he proposed that revolutions, contrary to 
the separate theories of Marx and Tocqueville, occur along a J- 
curve - a graphed relationship between needs satisfaction and 
time showing a gradual increase with a rapid descent occurring 
at the peak . He combined the theories of Marx and Tocqueville 
to reach his premise. 
Early on Marx and Engels fathered the idea that the 
capitalist degradation of the working class would eventually 
lead to the workers hurling off the chains of oppression in a 
revolution against the bourgeoisie. 
Sometime after the "Communist Manifesto", however, Marx 
also wrote that revolutions may occur for some other reason: 
...although the enjoyments of the workers 
have risen, the social satisfaction that they 
give has fallen in comparison with the 
increased enjoyments of the capitalist, which 
are not accessible to the worker, in 
1 
2 
comparison with the state of development of 
society in general.1 
In short, "degradation produces revolution."2 
This was also the basis of de Tocqueville1s argument. It 
is derived from his study of the French Revolution. He suggests 
that "[e]vils which are patiently endured when they seem 
inevitable become intolerable when once the idea of escape from 
them is suggested. "3 
Davies uses both of these theories (Marx's latter one and 
de Tocqueville1s) for the building of his own: "Revolutions are 
most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective 
economic and social development is followed by a period of 
sharp reversal."4 In his 1962 article Davies applied his theory 
to two successful revolutions and a failed rebellion: The 
Egyptian Revolution of 1952, The Russian Revolution of 1917, 
and Dorr's Rebellion of 1842. In all three cases he supported 
I.James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," 
American Sociological Review 27 (February 1962) citing 
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "Wage Labor and Capital," 
Selected Works in Two Volume (Moscow: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 1955): 94. 
2.Ibid., 5. 
3.Ibid. 
4.Ibid. 
his theory with detailed historical data; each of these cases 
fit very well into the J-Curve Theory. At the end of this 
article he also suggested other revolutions and social 
disturbances that may also follow his J-Curve Theory. Those 
include Leisler's Rebellion in 1689, The American Revolution, 
The French Revolution, the draft riots in New York City of 
1863, and the riots in Nyasaland in 1959. 
In a 1969 paper Davies applied his theory to the American 
Civil War of 1861, the Nazi Revolution of 1933, and the Black 
Rebellions of the 1960's. He also reexamined a previously 
touched upon case - The French Revolution. 
A negative case to his theory in which all of the J-Curve 
predictive were in place was the Great Depression of the 1930' 
in the United States. Davies believed there were two main 
reasons why neither rebellion nor revolution occurred: 1) The 
American government aggressively attacked the problem with 
government relief efforts and programs that, successful or not 
demonstrated a true compassion for the downtrodden. The 
government also worked closely with the business sector 
eliciting the cooperation of businessmen during the crucial 
months of 1933. These efforts helped to eliminate any 
impression that the affluent did not care about the needs of 
4 
the downtrodden, and solidified the government and business 
community, in the public's eye, as holder's of the same values. 
This leads to the second reason. 2) Americans, at the time, had 
a core value of beliefs that held them together -individualism, 
hard work, justice, etc. - that did not allow for a crack to 
develop among any of those that felt alienated during the 
Depression. The closest any crack came to emerging was in 
Louisiana with the movement led by Huey Long. This movement 
gave way to the constitutionalism that ran deep in most 
American's veins. 
Davies was not alone in this belief. Lawrence Stone also 
suggests that 11 [s] ome think that a potentially revolutionary 
situation in the United States in the 1930's was avoided by 
political action."5 Further, Isaac Kramnick "reformulated" 
Davies" theory around this particular incident: 
Revolutions are products of a sudden 
widening of the gap between expectation and 
gratification when it is perceived, correctly 
or incorrectly, that the governing is either 
B.Lawrence Stone. Theories of Revolution. World Politics 
18:2 (January 1966): 167. 
responsible for or incapable of dealing with 
this intolerable situation.s 
Relative Deprivation 
The term Relative Deprivation first appeared in the 1940' 
and has since been used in sociological work for "operational 
purposes". In 1970 Ted Gurr developed a theory of Relative 
Deprivation in his book Why Men Rebel. In the text he cites, 
first, the conventional definition for Relative Deprivation "a 
actors' perception of discrepancy between their value 
expectations and their value capabilities."7; Gurr defines it 
for his own purposes as "a negative discrepancy between 
legitimate expectations and actuality."8 
Gurr identifies two hybrids of his theory that have 
relevance to this paper and the hypothesis proposed: 
Aspirational Deprivation and Progressive Deprivation. The 
Aspirational Deprivation theory is based on historical 
6.Isaac Kramnick. Reflections on Revolution: Definition 
and Explanation in recent Scholarship. History and Theory 
(1972): 44. 
7.Ted Gurr. Why Men Rebel. (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New jersey: 1970): 24. 
8.Ibid, 25. 
citations by Gurr; Progressive Deprivation is the generalized 
"J-Curve Theory" proposed by Davies. 
Aspirational Deprivation is characterized "by an increase 
in men's value expectations without a concomitant change in 
value position or potential."9 Briefly, expectations rise 
without actual materialization. In this theory men do not lose 
what they have but feel they cannot achieve any of the values 
they see others acquiring. Because of this their demands become 
greater and intensified: 
It may be a demand for new values never 
previously held, such as political 
participation for colonial peoples and 
personal equality for members of lower class 
and caste groups...it may represent 
intensification of the commitment to a value 
position that earlier was weakly sought, for 
example intensifying demands for welfare 
goods among those who experience breakdown of 
communal life during the early stages of 
modernization, and intensified demands for 
access to political elite positions among the 
upwardly mobile. . .10 
The following graph illustrates Gurr's Aspirational 
Deprivation theory. 
9.Ibid, 24. 
10.Ibid, 50-51. 
RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND THE IMPETUS TO VIOLENCE 
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Thus, the higher expectations of the static group are 
created by the observance of some other group or individual 
obtaining a higher value position. Would this apply to a 
colonized country wherein the colonizers demonstrate a capacity 
to achieve a higher value position while the indigenous people 
remain at their pre-colonial level? The question urges for this 
hybrid theory to be used as the alternative in the hypothesis. 
-v 
The Progressive deprivation theory is Davies' own theory. 
In his description of this theory, Gurr makes some specific 
points that are relevant to this paper. First, the J-Curve 
"pattern is most coxranon in societies undergoing simultaneous 
ideological and systematic change."11 Secondly, the "...mob 
violence by African colonial peoples against their rulers 
11.Ibid, 53. 
8 
resembles the J-Curve argument."12 Lastly, " [i] ncreasing 
capabilities, as an object of government policy, require 
increasing mobilization of citizens for participation in the 
market economy and political life."13 This is quite often the 
case in colonized countries. 
Both of the hybrid theories of Relative Deprivation are 
essential to this study. The former, as noted above, will be 
used as the alternative to the latter. 
The J-Curve and Fear 
The J-Curve is a graphed relationship between needs 
satisfaction (jc-axis) and time (y-axis) . It displays the 
increasing ability of a society to fulfil more of its needs; 
Davies categorized these as basic needs, social needs, and "the 
need for equal dignity and justice."14 In short, a progressing 
society. 
The curve begins at the point where human beings are so 
oppressed that just staying alive is their only concern (Louis 
12.Ibid, 54. 
13.Ibid. 
14.Davies, 8. 
9 
Gottschalk also recognizes this in a 1944 article when he wrote 
that the need "for personal improvement...[is such] the 
discontented do not have time to think in terms of social 
betterment."15 - often times disrupting even basic family 
structures if fulfilling these needs is extremely difficult. 
The curve starts with a slow progression and rapidly becomes 
more vertical. At a point in the curve's rapid ascension there 
comes movement by the government (or appears to be) to suppress 
the gains made. The curve takes a dramatic downward turn at 
this point; it is at this point that revolution occurs. The 
following graph illustrates Davies' J-Curve theory. 
Nod Satibtaction and RjcvoLtmow 
15.Louis Gottschalk. Causes of Revolution. American 
Journal of Sociology 1 (July 1944) : 4. 
Davies holds that this sharp movement downward creates a 
fear among people that they will lose the gains made or will 
not be able to continue satisfying their needs at the current 
level. An important note: "Although physical deprivation in 
some degree may be threatened on the eve of all revolutions, 
need not be the prime factor, as it surely was not in the 
American Revolution of 1773."1S This reflects his idea that 
revolutions may occur when people are not actually suffering 
from economic deprivation but feel their expectations of 
continual progression may be in doubt. 
Isaac Kramnick suggests that Davies1 theory is based 
solely in economic determinism. To him the psychological fear 
(without the realization of economic deprivation) that gains 
will be lost is a result of material economic conditions at t'. 
time. 
Try as [Davies] may, all the indices are 
fundamentally economic in character. It is 
easy to talk of the mood of people, of states 
of mind; but when the presentation turns to 
its hard factual foundation, Davies cites 
only economic reality as putative proof of 
what must have been certain psychological 
reactions of frustration and aggression. 
16.Ibid. 
11 
A simple economic determinism is at work 
here.17 
There is no way to scientifically observe the disposition of a 
people immediately before a revolution, save for polling or 
editorials. There are, however, "statistical data...on rural 
uprisings, strikes, unemployment, costs of living...which it is 
assumed can be correlated with the popular mood."18 
Revolution Defined 
There are as many ways to define revolution, it seems, as 
there are revolutionary theorist. In the literature review for 
this paper several complete definitions for the term emerged. 
One popularly used definition (prior to the 1970's) was 
"...change, effected by the use of violence, in government, 
and/or regime, and/or society."19 Going back to the 1940's, 
Louis Gottschalk defines revolution as "...a popular movement 
whereby a significant change in the structure of a nation or 
17.Isaac Kramnick, 42. 
18.Ibid. 
19.Stone, 167. 
12 
society is effected."20 Both of these definitions are broad and 
encompassing and this is exactly why they are not suitable for 
the work at hand. 
The working definition to be used in this paper is the one 
Davies used in his original work: "[V]iolent civil disturbances 
that cause the displacement of one ruling group by another that 
has a broader popular basis for support."21 This definition 
rules out coup d'etat for coups do not necessarily engage broad 
popular support; they are, at best, the replacement of one 
ruling elite group or person with another. The phrase "violent 
civil disturbance" also invalidates using this definition for 
it is most often used to describe social change that is 
repeatedly referred to as "revolution". The "Conservative 
Revolution" in the 1980's or the "Sexual Revolution" of the 
1960's, both in the United States, are examples of this. 
Rebellions are also dismissed from this definition because the 
definition itself calls for the displacement of a ruling 
20.Louis Gottschalk, 6. 
21.Davies, Toward a Theory of Revolution. 6. 
13 
group:"rebellions do not remove the established government but 
instead are contained..."22 
Supporting Material for Davies' Theory- 
There is a great deal of prior work that, through hints 
and allegations, supports Davies' theory. As previously noted, 
Tocqueville saw revolution as a result of improving conditions 
within a society. Crane Brinton and Lyford Edwards also viewed 
revolutions as the result of improving economic conditions and 
rising classes. 
Rex Hopper, iri his essay "The Revolutionary Process", 
developed a framework for the study of revolutions. In his 
preliminary stage he identifies as part of the socio- 
psychological sequence toward revolution "wish repression" and 
"the increase in wealth, intelligence, and power of 'repressed 
groups' . "23 
Chalmers Johnson premised that revolutions occur because 
of a dysfunction (lack of harmony between the social system on 
the one hand and the political system on the other). In this 
22.Ibid, 6. 
23.Rex Hopper. "The Revolutionary Process". Social 
Forces, 1950, 271. 
14 
theory he notes that the most common factor involved in giving 
birth to a revolution is the "rapid economic growth" 
experienced by a society.24 
Developing the Question 
Davies' theory is based upon economic developments in the 
countries where he studied revolutions. Therefore, it is 
essential that the history, especially the economic history, of 
the countries in this paper be at the center of the question to 
be answered. 
Therefore, the questions are straightforward with little, 
nay, no ambiguity: Do the economic events that preceded the 
Algerian Revolution of 1954 and the Vietnamese Revolution of 
1945 follow the J-Curve Theory as proposed by James Davies in 
1962? If not, do the events follow the Aspirational Deprivation 
model as proposed by Gurr? 
Hypothesis and the Alternative 
The overwhelming evidence shown by Davies in his case 
studies would lead one to believe that his theory is virtually 
24.Stone, 165. 
15 
law. This is exactly why his theory needs to be tested in this 
study, and in other cases in the future - to establish if his 
theory is consistent or whether the revolutions he studied 
simply fit his J-Curve by fortune. My hypothesis for this study 
is an expectation that the events (especially economic events) 
from the time of French colonization until the revolutions in 
both Algeria and Vietnam correspond with Davies' J-Curve model. 
If the events in one or both do not fit the J-Curve pattern, 
then 1 expect one or both to fit the Aspirational Deprivation 
pattern. 
Why Algeria and France? 
This paper is a comparison of two nations that experienced 
revolutions during the 1950's - Vietnam and Algeria. Although 
one is in North Africa and the other is in Southeast Asia, the 
similarities are remarkably striking. Both countries are part 
of what is now termed the Global South; both were colonized 
during France's colonization period; both had traditional 
economic systems in place before and during the colonization 
period; both are moving toward "progressive" societies today; 
the events (colonization and subsequent revolution)in both 
countries occurred at approximately the same time; lastly, both 
16 
had populations which practiced religions other than 
Christianity before the colonization period. 
Vietnam and Algeria were chosen for two reasons. First, 
unlike the American Revolution, the revolutions in these two 
countries were carried out by the indigenous people. Davies 
successfully demonstrated that the events leading to the 
colonist's revolution in America fit the J-Curve 
extraordinarily well. Will that occur with indigenous 
revolutions against a colonizer? Secondly, although both 
countries possess several similarities there is a striking 
difference that will lend life to this study. Vietnam itself 
was an established, colonizing country when the French 
appeared on the scene; Algeria was simply a collection of 
ancient tribes that had never been organized into a nation- 
state. What effect does this dissimilarity have on the 
hypothesis? 
The regime structures in both Vietnam and Algeria during 
the colonial period were quite similar and yet different. Each 
country was run by a Governor-General appointed by the French 
government. In Algeria the daily affairs of state were 
transferred from the French government/military to the Algerian 
National Assembly (controlled by French settlers) in the late 
17 
nineteenth century. Their power was supported by a Council of 
Mayors, also controlled by the French settlers. The power of 
the assembly was also supported by the French government at 
home. 
In Vietnam the settlers were never powerful nor numerous 
enough to set up the same representative-type body. There was a 
Governor-General in charge of running the country's affairs. 
However, he usually maneuvered through the Vietnamese emperor's 
people and institutions. Again, the French government supported 
the Governor-General and usually relied on him to carry out its 
wishes. Also, in Vietnam the military played a significant role 
in the affairs of state throughout France's occupation. 
Methodology 
In his 1969 paper Davies laid the basis for the work to be 
done in this area. He states that in general theory (the 
abstract) one could state the same thing about one 
revolution or another; but, like most other things, each 
revolution is unique. He continues: 
And from the practical research standpoint, 
directly comparable data are not available 
for all revolutions ... In many nations now, 
the seeds of revolution are sprouting. But 
established governments in these nations are 
18 
not likely to welcome social scientists in 
search of data by conducting public opinion 
surveys inquiring about attitudes toward the 
government.25 
This paper will be done from a historical reference; 
looking back from the fact and identifying economic conditions 
in each revolution that may result in a J-Curve model. This is 
not to rule out the possibility that other events and/or people 
may have had a significant role in the production of these 
revolutions. An infinity of antecedents are possible triggering 
points of revolutions; yet, the purpose here is to see if these 
two revolutions lead us closer to the creation of a 
generalization (when/why revolutions occur) of the J-Curve 
approach. 
The research for this paper has been done using secondary 
and primary source material found in the documentation of 
France's colonization of Algeria and Vietnam and subsequent 
revolutions in both countries. Time and technology have allowed 
the events cited to be well documented and the data varies 
little from source to source. 
2 5.Davies, The J-Curve of Rising and Declining..., 
694-695. 
19 
This paper will examine the historical aspects of French 
colonization, the role of nationalism leading up to each 
revolution, the economic profiles of each country as they begin 
to become progressive societies, and will provide a concluding 
section wherein the data cited will be applied to Davies' 
theory. 
Limitations on the Study- 
There were several identifiable limitations to the 
development of this paper. First, an on-site study was not an 
option in the development of this paper due to economic, 
personal, and professional restrictions. The data that may be 
found by researching within each of these countries may lend 
more certainty to this study. 
Secondly, any reliable government documents for standard 
of living and economic growth and development in the nineteenth 
century are scarce for Algeria and Vietnam. The French 
government, though organized on these matters in its own 
country, did little as far as data collection in these two 
countries until the eve of their own expulsion. 
20 
Also, much of the evidence cited in this paper is based on 
evidence found by other researchers in this field. More often 
than not their data coincides with each other. 
CHAPTER 2 
ALGERIA 
Background to the Revolution 
Algeria, until the successful conclusion of the revolution 
against France in 1962, had been a land of tribal people almost 
always under the control of an empire. The Phoenicians, 
Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Belisarians, Spanish, Turks, 
and French occupied the country during their colonization 
periods. All of these colonizers centered their administrative 
facilities and personnel in Algiers, the port city on the 
Mediterranean Sea, and in other cities on the six hundred mile 
coast from Morocco to Tunisia. 
The influence of each of the colonizers reached, in 
varying distance, further inland from Algiers and, as each one 
came and went, left a particular stamp on the people. The most 
notable of these legacies are those of the Turks and French. 
The Turks dominated the area for nearly 3 00 years and when they 
left the people of the area spoke Arabic 
21 
22 
and practiced Islam (with some residual Animism) which is still 
with them today. 
The French came in the 1830's and stayed until the mid- 
twentieth century. Their contributions and impact on the region 
were as impressive and long lasting as the Turks' - if not more 
so. The French brought a basket of goods with them that are 
today an integral part of Algerian society. Among their 
contributions are language, infrastructure, an increase in 
arable farmland, administrative processes, and, lastly, liberal 
democracy (in theory, if not in practice) . 
And yet through all the conquest, the people of the 
Algerian area remained basically tribal and kept their 
traditions and practices alive - a drawback for the hopeful 
colonizers. This is noted in many works on the subject. The 
followers of the nineteenth-century Algerian revolutionary 
leader Abd-el-Kader stated this fact very well when referring 
to the French: "You are merely passing guests. You may stay 300 
years, like the Turks, but in the end you will leave."25 Also, 
"...for a long time even after the French invasion the majority 
26.Edward Behr. The Algerian Problem, 1926. W.W. 
Horton, New York, 1962: 39. 
23 
of the people of what later became Algeria...were little if at 
all concerned with the relations between the ruling groups and 
the European powers."27 
The French conquest began in May, 1830 when Charles X, 
seeking to increase his public support which was suffering from 
unfavorable domestic conditions, launched an invasion force 
into Algiers. His pretense for the invasion was based on an 
incident that occurred in 1827. 
The French Consul in Algiers met with the Dey of Algiers, 
Husain, in an effort to settle the long running dispute 
concerning the grain debt incurred by the French to the Dey 
during Napoleon's Egyptian and European expeditions. During the 
course of the discussion the Dey became infuriated and whipped 
the Consul with his fly-whisk. 
Charles' rule ended just months after the invasion 
and France was to see a line of failed rulers and governments 
for the next thirty years. This instability at home was not 
promising for the French in Algeria. Policy changed so often 
that the administration in Algiers eventually began to ignore 
policy orders it did not agree with and create its own policy. 
27.Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore. Africa Since 1800. 
Cambridge University Press, England. 1967: 95-96. 
24 
Algiers and the rest of the coast fell quite easily to the 
French. In fact the coastal residents saw it simply as a 
changing of the guard and the French as their new protectors. 
...[T]he inhabitants of the coastal towns and 
those social groupings which had 
traditionally made up the allies of the Dey 
proved friendly to the French and anxious to 
accept their protection. The reason was 
simply that the French were able to exploit 
the age-old rivalry between the townsfolk and 
the peasants of the coastal region on the one 
hand and the men of the hills and mountains 
on the other.28 
This citation illustrates that the conquerors of Algiers 
never really controlled and changed the people of the interior 
who continued to live in their traditional tribes. 
The Muslims of the interior were essentially the tribesmen 
who had lived there for centuries and adopted Islam during the 
Turks rule. In 1832 Abd-el-Kader began a campaign to unite the 
tribes of the interior and, consequently, launched a jihad (a 
holy war) against the conquering French with a newly created 
standing army. This jihad brought the French out of the coastal 
regions and into the inlands in an effort to defeat the tribal 
troops. In their efforts the French systematically gained 
2 8.Behr, 25. 
25 
control of Abd-el-Kader1s territories until complete control of 
modern-day Algeria was complete in 1857. The battles continued 
through 1847 when Abd-el-Kader was captured by the troops of 
the French General Bugeaud. His capture, however, did not end 
the sporadic fighting which would not desist until 1879. 
In these newly conquered territories colons (colonists), 
initially from France but later from Spain, Italy and Malta, 
were brought in to occupy the land and the native inhabitants 
were displaced to less fertile lands. These colons were 
exceedingly poor people and most had made the trek to Algeria 
in search of wages. Estimates on their numbers and growth vary 
according to accounts. For example, one author suggests the 
population of Europeans in Algeria by 1845 to have been 
46,08029, while another puts the population at about 100,000 in 
184730. These same sources saw dissimilar growth in the area as 
well. The former submits the European population in 1880 to 
have been between 245,000 and 276,000 while the latter puts the 
number at 300, 000.31 
29.Behr, 27. 
30.Oliver, 97. 
31.Note: The Cremieux decree of 1870 made all of these 
settlers French citizens. 
26 
This new population of Europeans clashed with the native 
inhabitants over land rights until the French administration 
had completely displaced the natives and secured the most 
fertile land for the colons. The distrust and hatred in nearly 
every area between the Colons and Moslems was a never ending 
story and, as is noted below, was a primary cause of the 
revolution in 1954. 
In 187 0 the French military finally relinquished power in 
part to the fall of the Second Empire and the army's defeat at 
the hands of the Prussians. Civilian rule took over in Algeria 
which was now an official French territory. The entire country 
was securely in the hands of the French with military troops 
maintaining control of the indigenous population in the 
southern territories. For the next half century France would 
develop the interior of Algeria, and Algeria would send 
deputies to Paris "in the same way as the Alces Maritimes or 
the Marne."32 The bel epoque in Algeria had begun by 1870. 
32.Jane S. Nickerson. A Short History of North Africa. New 
York: Bilbo and Tannen: 190. 
27 
Nationalism 
When the nationalist movement began, following the French 
occupation, the indigenous people were at the initial point of 
economic development in Davies' model; its development fits the 
model relatively accurately. 
Abd-el-Kader was the first nationalist figure to appear in 
French-held Algeria. After his demise, there were no serious 
nationalist movements until World War I ended. In fact, after 
his fall the tribal mentality once again prevailed: "It would 
take generations of modernization, a break down of primitive 
tribes, before the xenophobic instinct would give way to a 
contemporary desire for a unified, self-governing state."33 Abd- 
el-Kader 's successes against the French were not lost in 
history; he eventually became an Algerian hero and inspiration. 
By the turn of the century those "generations" had come to 
pass. Young, Islamic Algerian nationalists, born around the 
turn of the century, were not the same group of people the 
French encountered upon their arrival in 183 0 - and the French 
were mostly responsible for the change. Displacement from one's 
33.Behr, 42. 
28 
land, immigration, and education were the spring boards for the 
nationalist movement. 
During the latter-half of the nineteenth century French 
development of the land and infrastructure essentially- 
eliminated famine, while vaccines and quinine saved many an 
Algerian who would have normally died through natural checks. 
Though these developments represent an improvement in such 
social and economic value areas as health and modernization, 
they actually did little to help the population at large or in 
the long-run. These two developments drove two things: the 
population up and many Algerians off of their land and into the 
cities. This fact is well documented by Kraft and Talbott, 
respectively: "Squeezed out of traditional society, they 
[Moslems] migrated into the European sector of the economy. 
From 1880-1920, there flowed a steadily rising stream of people 
from the tribes... into the centers of European colonization.1,34 
"After 1870... improved sanitary conditions and the spread of 
European medicine reduced the death rate, disrupting the 
34.Kraft, 19. 
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mechanism that kept a peasant society from outstripping its 
material resources."35 
A significant number of those driven off the land sought 
relief in France itself. 
One escape... opened up for the landless and 
homeless Moslems: temporary migration to 
France. Set in motion in the 1890's when 
Marseilles shippers imported Algerian labor 
to fight a dock strike, the Moslem migratory 
wave swelled during World War I and the early 
twenties, ebbed during the Great Depression 
and World War II, then swept back in the 
postwar years.36 
Of those Algerians who arrived, many stayed in France not 
only learning in the schools but also learning from the 
everyday life in Western Europe. 
Emigration to France had a marked impact on 
Algerian Muslim workers. The higher wages and 
better labor conditions made them more 
conscious of the economic inequalities 
in Algeria. Most of the early arrivals 
joined,or came under the influence of, the 
French Communists and other leftist 
parties.37 
35.Talbott, 15. 
36.Kraft, 23. 
37.Paul A. Jureidini. Case Studies in Insurgency and 
Revolutionary Warfare. Special Operations research Office, The 
American University, Washington University. December, 1963: 29. 
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Education also accounted for the rise of the Algerian 
nationalists at the turn of the century. French administrators 
in the nineteenth century did not actively seek to educate the 
indigenous Moslem population in the French colonial schools. 
The French government allowed for the education of the 
indigenous people to take place in the Qu'ranic schools but 
only on the primary level (these schools were called msid); the 
secondary schools (madrasas) were taken over by the French "in 
order to assure a constant supply of loyal native 
administrators."38 During this same time period the colons also 
feared Moslems educated in the French school system. The colons 
"believed to educate a colonized person would simply create a 
potential troublemaker.1,39 
The Algerians had their role to play in the educational 
history, too. Moslems, unlike the Europeans of the time, 
believed that education and religion went hand-in-hand. Even if 
the French were to allow Moslems into the colonial schools 
(early on, some modest attempts were made to allow for this) 
3 8.Heggoy, Alf Andrew. French Influence on North African 
Education 1880-1962: An Introduction. Proceedings and Papers of 
the Georgia Association of Hi9tpriang—1996: 131. 
39.Ibid, 132. 
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the Moslem parents would not send their children. They feared 
"that French schools would proselytize their young Muslim 
wards."40 For these reasons the education system in Algeria 
remained segregated and two-tiered until the last decade of the 
eighteen hundreds.41 
By the end of the nineteenth century the Algerian Moslems 
began to demand a French-based education for their children. 
Their travels to France opened their eyes to the benefits such 
an education would provide for their children in a rapidly 
developing world. The following two excerpts emphasize this 
point: 
Attitudes changed slowly, but after World War 
I the refusal of Algerian parents to send 
their children to colonial schools became a 
demand that places be made for their children 
in these same schools. Fear that Muslim youth 
would be converted to Christianity had been 
replaced by the realization that, as long as 
France was mistress to the Maghrib, colonial 
schools offered the best path to better jobs 
in the slight but developing modern sectors 
of the local economy. These schools also 
opened doors to official bureaucratic 
positions in the imperial administration.42 
40.Ibid. 
41.Note: Education for the masses of indigenous people 
remained uncommon up through the 1950's. 
42.Ibid. 
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During the earliest years of the colonial 
period opposition to colonialism had been the 
opposition of the least Westernized groups, 
whose leaders simply wanted to drive out the 
Europeans and restore the situation which had 
previously existed. From the mission schools, 
however, there was beginning to emerge...a 
new kind of opposition to colonialism. This 
opposition did not aim to restore the pre- 
colonial situation. On the contrary, the aim 
of the mission educated Africans was to 
capture the political and religious 
institutions introduced into Africa from the 
West.43 
Immigration and education, therefore, were the driving 
forces behind the nationalist movement as it entered the 
twentieth century. These two areas, as the evidence suggests, 
also represent a value progression (according to Davies model) 
for at least part of the indigenous population. 
From immigration and the demand for equal education in the 
colonial schools arose a new type of young Algerian 
nationalist, referred to as evolues (literally, "the evolved 
ones"). The schools they attended had a curriculum which was 
"entirely French and allowed no place for Arabic studies... 
[w]ithin a generation, a class of well-educated, gallicized 
43.Oliver, 157. 
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Muslims...had been created."44 It was from this group that "a 
new Algerian self-consciousness developed. 1,45 
The evolues were not, however, a separate sub-group or 
class entity like the Berbers or other clans. The evolues were 
made up of people from different religious, ethnic and social 
backgrounds from all parts of Algeria. Their individual 
histories and cultures were as diverse as the people 
themselves. Their common bond was their belief and education in 
Western ideas and their strive to be equal with their European 
colonizers. 
The new Algerian nationalists, in the beginning, were 
quite liberal (in Western-European terms) in their thinking. It 
appears these nationalists had their value expectations as 
prescribed by Davies. They were a "Western-educated and 
Western-inspired elite... followed by a vast population 
unschooled in Western ways and concepts."46 The evolues' 
education was rich in "the idea of progress, equality before 
44.Algeria! A Country Study, ed. Helen Chapin Metz 
(Federal Research Division Library of Congress, 1994): 37. 
45.Ibid. 
4 6.Kenyon Gillespie. Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution. 
(Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, New York: 1960): 4. 
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the law, careers open to talent."47 Because of their French 
education and intermingling with the colons and Metropolitan 
Frenchmen, they focused their efforts on working with the 
French to realize the dream of one day having all Algerians 
become full French citizens. 
In fact, the earliest of the nationalist leaders had their 
reservations when talk arose of a separate Algerian country 
(apart from France) populated by Algerian people. Ferhat Abbas, 
a leading French-schooled nationalist and leader of the 
Association of Moslem Students, made a statement in 1936 
(written in 1934, by some accounts) that neither the French nor 
the colons would ever allow him to forget: 
Men who die for a patriotic ideal are 
honoured and respected. But I would not die 
for an Algerian fatherland, because no such 
fatherland exist. I search the history books 
and I cannot find it. You cannot build on 
air. 
This sentiment was not new to 193 6; The liberal approach 
was being advocated before the first World War: 
As early as 1912 a Moslem newspaper published 
in Djidjelli, Rachidi, asked for full French 
citizenship rights in return for French- 
imposed conscription laws in Algeria. In 1922 
Abd-el-Kader's grandson, the Emir Khaled, 
47.Ibid. 
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himself a former captain in the French army, 
protested against discrimination against 
Moslems in the army's promotion system, 
demanded selection in civilian and military 
fields based on merit alone. Ferhat Abbas's 
own goal, for a long time, was to be a 
Frenchman. . .48 
The liberal evolu.es were met time and again with 
frustration from the French when their demands were put forth. 
The French government cannot be held fully responsible for 
neglecting the liberals; even when the French government took 
steps to rectify the problems their efforts were obstructed by 
the colons. "Various laws were passed to protect Algerian 
property from land-greedy colons, but all too often they were 
easily circumvented."49 Some members of the French government 
even pleaded with the settlers to listen to the demands of the 
liberals - for their own sake. Maurice Violette, Governor- 
General of Algeria in the 1930's: 
made a memorable speech in the National 
Assembly: "These Moslems, when they protest, 
you become indignant,; when they approve, you 
become suspicious; when they keep quiet, you 
become afraid...They crave 
48.Behr, 43. 
49.Alister Horne. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954- 
1962.(Viking Penguin, Inc., New York, New York: 1977): 31. 
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to be admitted to your country. Should you 
refuse, you may well fear that they will soon 
create one.1,50 
Despite the setbacks there were some accomplishments made 
by the liberals and their allies in the French government, 
though eventually thwarted by the settlers. In 1873, for 
example, the private-property code (an essentially European 
idea) was imparted to the Moslem population; in 1900 Algeria 
was granted financial autonomy; and in 1919, in tribute to the 
sacrifices made by Algerian Moslems in World War I, George 
Clemenceau forced through the Algerian Charter. It was intended 
to end unequal taxation, broaden the franchise, create more 
schools for the indigenous population, and protect the 
indigenous property. The Charter, however, in its final 
product, did little more than give the Moslems the right to 
elect their own representatives. These were the final upward 
movements of expectations upward. 
One of the most far-reaching proposals made by the French 
government to remove at least part of the obstacles was made in 
1936 by the Blum-Violette Project (Leon Blum was Premier of the 
Popular Front Party in France). This is also the downward turn 
SO.Behr, 48. 
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of expectations by the liberals that gave life to the 
independent nationalist movement. This proposal was designed to 
get to the heart of the liberal grievances by enabling Moslems 
to enter into French citizenship without having to renounce 
their Koranic laws within their private lives and allowing 
certain groups of Moslems (such as teachers and veterans) to 
vote in Colony wide elections for the French Chamber. This 
measure "would have extended the franchise to about 21,000 
Moslems: 4 per cent of the total."51 The proposal was met head 
on by the settlers. 
The failure of the Blum-Violette plan and the evidence of 
the French weaknesses in their World War II defeat set the 
stage for the nationalists to take a different approach. With 
liberalism finding resistance at every turn, the nationalists 
leaders turned to efforts to eject the French outright. 
One of the figures to lead this movement, and convert many 
liberals to his approach was Messali Hadj. Messali was a poorly 
educated man who fought in the French army during World War I. 
He stayed in France after the war and became well versed in 
Communist ideology (and the communists' belief in 
5I.Kraft, 44. 
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organization). While in France, he led, and founded, several 
revolutionary groups. The group that would lead the 
revolutionary movement was the Algerian Peoples' Party (PPA) 
later to evolve into the National Liberation Front (FLN). 
Messali drew his base of support from the Moslem veterans 
of World War I and the ill-educated, Arabic speaking people in 
Algeria. His rhetoric was welcomed by those who had seen, and 
lived through, the failures of the liberals. 
From 1940 forward revolution became unavoidable. Any plans 
put forward by French Prime Minister Charles De Gaulle or 
Algerian Governor Pitain (numerous and sizable after the French 
saw the writing on the wall) were dismissed in favor of full 
revolution. The idea of "French Algeria" had been replaced by 
"Algerian Algeria" (this term was used to identify an Algeria 
independent of French entanglement). The liberals, who for 
nearly a half-century tried to work with the French, were now 
in the fold of Messali and his revolutionist. 
Economics 
To put the economic profile of French Algeria into its 
proper perspective, one must study the development and 
prospects of two separate groups: the evolues and the Moslem 
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masses. This is the study of two sides of the same coin. First, 
the masses. 
The standard-of-living of the indigenous people when the 
French arrived was exactly at the point Davies' and others 
called nothing more than survival. The mass of Moslem tribes 
that populated the interior when the French arrived were 
essentially living in a world gone by: "At one jump Algeria 
found herself crossing the centuries, and from the Middle Ages 
plunged suddenly into the mid-nineteenth century."52 They lived 
off the land in homogeneous tribal units that rarely integrated 
with other tribes because tribal customs and norms defined each 
people. 
Famine, disease, drought and famine were most responsible 
for population control: 
Not for any of these people was life a 
pastoral Arcady. Ignorant and superstitious, 
they were plunged in a perpetual battle for 
survival by disease, famine, and nearly 
constant tribal skirmishings. Extremes of 
heat and cold plagued them; while spring 
rains often threatened to flood them out. 
52.Nickerson, 105. 
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summer was an endless quest for water and 
shade.53 
Yet, the system worked between nature and man and allowed 
for the farming and grazing of the land that kept the 
population flourishing: "Though hardly glorious, there did 
prevail a civilization with a delicate inner balance. This 
balance the French occupiers destroyed.1,54 
A middle class, small though it was, existed within this 
pre-colonial structure. It generally developed among the five 
to six per cent that dwelt within the cities and consisted of 
religious and legal types. However, most of the population 
lived in the interior in the nomadic tribes and eked out a 
living from the land. 
With France's arrival in 1830 two events quickly changed 
the complex of the economy that had existed and fit well into 
Davies' model. First, the middle class that had existed was 
eradicated. "The small Algerian middle stratum of urban 
merchants and city artisans was squeezed out, and landowners of 
53.Kraft, 26. 
54.Ibid. 
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the country side were dispossessed."55 The French quickly- 
converted the mosques into churches and Arabic law was replaced 
by the Western system. The Moslem middle class would not 
reemerge until the end of the nineteenth century in the form of 
the evolues. 
Secondly, there was a large displacement of the tribal 
people from the fertile lands onto the poorer lands of the 
region. From the earliest arrival of soldiers the best lands in 
Algeria were taken by the French, and this displacement 
continued throughout the 1800's. At first the French stayed 
near the coast and began the drainage of the Mitidja ( the 
"mosquito-ridden marshes"56 surrounding Algiers) and began 
farming on this area. It was not until French forces began to 
seek out Abd-el Kader's forces did the land snatching begin in 
earnest. As the colons arrived they began to settle the 
occupied lands of the hinterlands taken by the French forces 
from Abd-el- Kader. Within nine years following the invasion 
the European population reached 25,000 with 11,000 being 
Frenchmen. The government encouraged their settlement at the 
5 5.Metz, 17. 
5 6.Horne, 32. 
42 
expense of the indigenous population in an effort to further a 
Gallic civilization: 
Free land was made available to individuals 
by the arbitrary confiscation of indigenous 
holdings. In 1840 certain Algerian tribes 
were placed on restricted reservations 
(cantonments) and their remaining land was 
appropriated. All lands belonging to 
Algerians who had taken up arms against the 
French were confiscated on November 1 of that 
year...All nondeveloped properties for which 
no justifiable titles were held prior to July 
1, 1830 [noting, of course, the tribes had no 
need for such European things as titles ], 
were proclaimed to be government land in 1844 
and 1846.57 
French land speculators were brought in to devour the 
former tribal lands thus victimizing the indigenous population: 
In one notorious transaction...a settler 
bought for twenty francs a small share of a 
700-acre parcel of land belonging jointly to 
513 Arabs; he divided the whole parcel into 
shares for each holder, charging for his 
troubles 11,000 Francs; when that fee could 
not be met, he acquired the whole 700 
acres .58 
57.Jureidini, 20. 
58.Ibid., 21. 
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As the French continued on, many of the displaced people 
began to move to the cities in search of a living. 
Displaced villagers and tribesmen flocked to 
towns and cities, where they formed an 
unskilled labor mass, ill-adapted to 
industrial work, scorned by Europeans, and 
isolated from the kinship units that had 
formerly given them security and a sense of 
solidarity.5S 
These city immigrants were caught between a dying world - 
their tribal world - and a newly emerging one that they were 
not prepared to enter. They lived among the Europeans in 
Bidonvilles, or tin-can towns, which were structures made of 
the basest of materials. These people were considered to be the 
subproletariat class since the colon working class made up the 
proletariat class. They worked at the most menial jobs making a 
fraction of the wages the colon worker earned. In short, the 
indigenous masses reaped little of the economic profits made in 
Algeria. 
Industrialization, which may have brought some economic 
relief to these homeless, displaced people, had not emerged in 
Algeria by as late as 1954 due in large part to a 4colonial 
economic compact' supported by the wealthy colons. The 
59.Metz, 17. 
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'compact' allowed them to export their agricultural products 
(grapes, grasses, tobacco, etc.) to France thus encouraging 
agricultural production over industrialization. The wealthy- 
colons, meanwhile, invested their money into businesses based 
in France. 
The French levied a disproportionate amount of the tax 
burden on the shoulders of the indigenous Moslem population 
which added to their "survival only" existence. In 1909, for 
instance, "Muslims, who made up almost 90 percent of the 
population but produced 20 percent of Algeria's income, paid 70 
percent of direct taxes and 45 percent of the total taxes 
collected. "60 
Thus, the mass of indigenous people were plagued by land 
displacement, discrimination, unemployment and disproportionate 
taxing at the hands of the French. Alister Horne described the 
situation best: 
Thus in the all-important realm of 
agriculture, as indeed in that of industrial 
development later, the colons could 
reasonably claim that they had created the 
country out of virtually nothing. But it was 
the same old, old story of the Europeans with 
their superior technique, resources and 
aggressive vigour progressively assimilating 
60.Metz, 33. 
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the best lands, while at the same time the 
more numerous indigenes were being pushed out 
on to the more peripheral lands.61 
The French, in spite of all their atrocities, did bring to 
the population as a whole an improved standard of living. But 
was it substantial enough to bring the masses of people up 
along the J-Curve? The evidence suggest it wasn't. Yet, 
improvements were made: improved medical conditions, noted 
above, increased the population and extended the life span; the 
French created a network of railroads between the major cities; 
they improved the ports (and in the twentieth century built the 
airports); they constructed modern communication systems; and, 
although they fought to not educate the indigenous people, they 
gave rise to the evolues through education. This would be their 
undoing. 
The evolues were a purely French creation. The evolues' 
desire was not to eject the French from Algeria but to 
assimilate all Algerians into Frenchmen. Their actions stemmed 
from their Western education and immersion into French life - 
both in Algeria among the colons and in metropolitan France. 
The evolues' roots took hold around 1870, the same time 
61.Horne, 32. 
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military rule gives way to civilian rule in Algeria. The 
French, in need of interlocuteurs valables ("valid go- 
betweens") for themselves and the masses, enlisted the services 
of a small percentage of the population to fulfill this role. 
Their name among the people soon become Beni Oui Ouis, or "The 
tribe of yes men." Their income was well above the lower class 
indigenous masses yet substantially lower than the European 
middle class. Because of this they were accepted in neither 
circles and, at the same time, moved in both. The fracture 
between the evolues and the indigenous lower class and the 
ruling colons is well noted in the following two citations: 
[i]ndeed from the beginning there was little 
love lost between them [evolues] and the 
Muslim masses, who saw their natural leaders 
seduced away by titles, medals, and 
privileges to support a system which confined 
them in a position of permanent 
inferiority.62 
"The colons who ran Algeria maintained a condescending dialogue 
only with the beni-oui-ouis .1,63 
The "yes men" accumulated a good deal of wealth and access 
in their positions. The evidence suggests they were moving 
62.Nickerson, 192. 
63.Metz, 34. 
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upward along the J-Curve. They were able to: 1.provide their 
children with French-based educations, 2.marry into some of the 
lower strata of European society, and 3.revive the "traditional 
Muslim middle class, eliminated during the middle of the 19th 
century. "64 
The greatest objection the evolues had with the French was 
the denial of indigenous Moslems French citizenship (entailing 
all the rights and power that go along with it) without 
abandoning their status under Muslim civil law. Proposals were 
made by the French government in 1865 and 1871 to offer French 
citizenship to Moslems, but such citizenship required 
repudiation of Muslim civil law. This dilemma was finally 
resolved in the 1920's but, again, the reaction by the French 
was too late. 
64.Jureidini, 31. 
CHAPTER 3 
VIETNAM 
Before a discussion of Vietnamese nationalism and 
economics in relation to the J-Curve can proceed there are some 
historical peculiarities that must be noted that set Vietnam 
apart from the Algerian situation. These differences are: 1. the 
Chinese influence upon the Vietnamese culture and government, 
and 2.the colonization by Vietnam of surrounding lands before 
the arrival of the French. These characteristics must be 
recognized and considered before moving forward. 
Vietnam was settled by the Viet people, northern migrants 
from south China, about one thousand years ago. Their history 
has been recorded in detail in numerous publications. The point 
here is to underscore the historical aspects that make Vietnam 
different from the Algerian case. 
The Vietnamese, after several hundred years of Chinese 
domination, gained their independence approximately nine 
hundred years ago. With this independence came a considerable 
48 
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amount of Chinese cultural and governmental baggage in both 
philosophical and material dimensions. 
First, the Chinese gave to the Vietnamese a Confucian- 
based governmental system and philosophy for living. This 
philosophy, as applied to the governmental operations, produced 
a centralized system of government. The government was headed 
by an emperor who ruled by the theory of divine right. Under 
him, the government was staffed by people who passed civil 
service test (adopted from the Chinese) to acquire their 
positions. The government that evolved was, in short, a pyramid 
structure. In action, this did not lead to smooth execution: 
In practice, the antiquarian Confucian 
philosophy often led to reactionary attitudes 
and harsh enforcement of arbitrary laws. In 
general, few but the wealthy could afford the 
study time for the examinations, yet this did 
not produce a fixed class structure. A 
wealthy family that produced no scholars soon 
declined. Often villages or family clans 
would subsidize a poor but bright village 
boy, for his successes would bring honor to 
them all.65 
The Chinese-influenced culture came into conflict with the 
Chinese-influenced Vietnamese government. The Vietnamese 
65.Chester A. Bain. Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict. 
(Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1967): 14. 
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communal structure was, and to a great extent continues to be, 
a village- centered society. The village is the organizational 
hub for most Vietnaunese; the role of the government is dwarfed 
by the family and the village. In fact, a Vietnamese saying 
encompasses this thought completely: The power of the emperor 
ends at the village fence. 
The Confucian philosophy adopted from the Chinese also had 
its bearing on Vietnamese religion. Before the arrival of the 
French and Catholics most Vietnamese worshiped their dead 
ancestors. This philosophy led the Vietnamese to place the 
family, and respect within the family, above all else. In fact, 
in most traditional homes there are still altars set up for 
families to pray to their ancestors. 
Materially the Chinese gave to the Vietnamese a life 
centered around agriculture - specifically, rice growing. This 
method of subsistence kept them away from the mountains and 
focused the mass of the population along the flood plains of 
the rivers and around the river deltas. The Vietnamese learned 
from the Chinese the methods for flooding the plains to grow 
rice. This livelihood was the center of village activity in 
almost all Vietnamese villages - save for those which focused 
on craftsmanship, which were very few in number. 
Thus, the Chinese influence permeated all aspects of 
Vietnamese life until the French colonization period. This 
influence can still be found, at least in part, in the culture 
today. 
The Vietnamese originally began, and governed, in the 
northern and central province of Tonkin and Annam (a term given 
by the French) . From there the Vietnamese began a slow process 
of colonization southward in to the province of Cochin china 
(present day southern Vietnam). The early emperors had their 
sights set on conquering the entire lands that separated Siam 
from China. These lands included the present day countries of 
Laos and Cambodia. The emperors were colonizing in an attempt 
to become an Asian power; if possible, to replace China as the 
region's dominant power. Over the centuries the Vietnamese 
emperors managed to colonize large portions of both Laos and 
Cambodia. When the French colonized Vietnam, they retained 
these territories for themselves. 
It was under this framework that the French first 
encountered the Vietnamese. Vietnam was a very old, independent 
nation (older at the time than most European nations) that had 
long established itself under the guidance of Chinese 
influence. It was also a colonizing nation seeking, if not for 
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industrial purposes, the same glory and power the conquering 
French sought. 
French Colonization 
Thus, unlike the situation in Algeria, the French 
government was not first on the scene in Vietnam. Catholic 
missionaries from France began arriving in Vietnam nearly a 
century before the arrival of the French military and settlers 
(those that did come) in the mid-lSOO's. In fact, it was the 
alleged maltreatment of the missionaries by the emperor's 
government that gave the French their in-road into Vietnam in 
the form of harbor bombings; retaliation by the Vietnamese 
against the Catholics further justified French interference. 
Thieu Tri, the emperor of Vietnam from 1841-1847 and ruler 
during the first French attack on the Vietnamese fleet at Da 
Nang in 1847, "denounced Catholic priests as foreign agents who 
should be killed on sight."66 Yet, he saw the French attack for 
what it was - the beginning of a conquest looking for an 
excuse. For this reason he did not execute a single missionary 
during his reign. 
66. William J. Duiker. Vietnam.(Westview Press: Boulder, 
Colorado: 1982): 70. 
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Thieu Tri was stuck between a rock and a hard place. To 
protect his country from the French would require modernization 
of the entire country; however, modernization would disrupt the 
feudal system that kept the imperial system working. To save 
his country would require losing his authority. 
His son and successor, Tu Due, was confronted with the 
same dilemma: 
Tu Due...clung even more stubbornly to the 
belief that Vietnam could not disrupt its 
feudal institutions for the sake of security. 
Embarking on a fierce campaign to eliminate 
Christianity, he thereby antagonized the 
French just as they were exploring ways to 
escalate their offensive against his country. 
His myopic intransigence made him the last 
independent ruler of Vietnam.67 
On the other hand Tu Due was a very capable and moderate 
leader who opposed the Catholic missionaries for very germane 
reasons. He felt the missionaries threatened to undermine the 
Confucian basis that legitimated his power. He was also 
concerned, and rightly so, that the missionaries "actually 
represented French political and military interests.,,S8 
67.Ibid. 
68.Ibid. 
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This resistance to modernize and the resolute adherence of 
the emperor and his people to remain in a feudal way of life 
indicates the Vietnamese were in a peculiar position on either 
economic model at the time of the French arrival. The 
Vietnamese were not necessarily at the simple survival stage 
the Algerians were in but they were also not in the 
progressive, industrial stage of their conqueror either. The 
colonizing aspect of the nation reveals that they had surpassed 
the life of basic survival and yet were existing at the 
economic level of Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries. 
The attack on the Vietnamese at Da Nang in 1848 was just 
the beginning of clashes between the French and the Vietnamese. 
The battles continued until 1861 when Tu Due "gave France the 
three provinces adjacent to Saigon"69. The Vietnamese had fought 
hard to keep the French out and now they felt they had been 
betrayed by their own emperor. Even in betrayal the Vietnamese 
launched a steady stream of resistance against the French who 
had brought with them to Vietnam "iron and flame" - the 
destructors of the feudal system. The Vietnamese continued to 
69.Ibid, 76. 
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fight a losing battle as the French continued to claim the 
lands to the north. By 1883 the war was lost and Vietnam 
belonged to the French: 
The year 1883 witnessed the death of Tu 
Due...It was the last year of independence 
for nineteenth century Vietnam. The French 
then moved in force on Tonkin. Meanwhile, 
outside Hue, they bombarded the entrance to 
the River of Perfumes and imposed a 
protectorate on the Vietnamese imperial 
court.70 
Even after the complete take over of the country the 
conflicts and skirmishes never really ended for the French in 
Vietnam as they had in Algeria (by the end of the nineteenth 
century) . The main factor for this was the nationalism that 
continued to plague the French. 
Vietnamese Nationalism 
The nationalists' chronicle in Vietnam is, in one marked 
way, quite similar to the Algerians. As noted in the previous 
section, the Vietnamese nationalists fought the French for 
every tract of land. .These original nationalists were fighting 
to protect the feudal system that they developed over 
70.Vietnam; A Country Study, ed. Ronald J. Cima. (Federal 
Research Division Library of Congress, 1989): 27. 
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centuries. "The first nationalist groups tried to fight with 
traditional methods, but with their failure, subsequent leaders 
turned to Western techniques."71 They were fighting to protect a 
way of life that Western influence, in the form of the French, 
threatened and, to a great degree did, eliminate. This scenario 
was quite similar to that in Algeria under Abd-el-Kader and his 
campaign for pre-colonialism. 
With French occupation there arose a Vietnamese 
nationalism that was quite similar to that of Abd-el-Kader. 
Through the mid-nineteenth century some Vietnamese nationalists 
wanted to adopt Western technology and philosophy to achieve 
their goal. These nationalist resembled the Evolues in that 
they wished to remain enmeshed in a French-Vietnam structure. 
The vast majority, however, chose to use and retain their 
Confucian-based, feudal structure in their efforts to oust the 
French. 
"By the turn of the century, a whole generation of 
Vietnamese had grown up under French control."72 Like in 
Algeria, there was a class of nationalists in Vietnam who had 
71.Bain, 3. 
72.Cima, 3 5. 
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reaped the benefits of French occupation: they had studied in 
France and their families had become quite wealthy working 
within the French system. Unlike Algeria, there was a group of 
nationalists who, though well educated due in large part to the 
French, sought to retain the feudal system of life. Though 
there emerged two distinct philosophies to the nationalist 
cause they were both due to opportunities afforded them by 
French occupation. This scenario, like the one in Algeria, 
shows at least a segment of the society's population reaping 
the values brought by the colonizer. This evidence combined 
with the feudal structure and a relatively crude economic 
structure (compared with Western cultures) shows a J-Curve 
pattern developing again, at least among some of the 
population. 
The evidence of two distinct nationalist groups emerging 
at the end of the century can be found in two figures: Phan Boi 
Chou- a devout nationalist - and Phan Chu Trinh - a western 
influenced liberal. 
Phan Boi never collaborated with French officials and was 
a leader of the anticolonial movement. He had been "trained in 
the Confucian tradition under his father and other local 
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teachers."73 He had spent years studying and passed the regional 
exam (borrowed from the Chinese and maintained by the French) 
in 1905. 
Phan Boi's style of resistance may have been a result of 
watching the French continuously crush any uprisings waged by 
the Vietnamese scholar-gentry in the name of independence for 
the emperor/feudal structure. It is not certain but there was a 
large group of nationalist's who thought and felt the same way. 
Phan Boi, and those who thought like him, wanted to drive the 
French out and restore Vietnam's independence. 
Phan Chu was a horse of a different color. Phan Chu 
...was greatly influenced by the writings of 
French political philosophers Rousseau and 
Montesquieu, and he believed that the French 
colonial administration could serve as a 
progressive force to establish a Western 
democratic political structure through 
peaceful reforms.74 
These two men, and the groups they led, tried to come to 
some sort of working agreement when they met in Japan in 1906 
as part of the Duy Tan Hoi (Reformation Society). They met for 
73.Ibid. 
74.Ibid, 36. 
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nearly two weeks but could reach no compromise over the type of 
government each one foresaw for Vietnam. 
Whereas Phan Boi Chou favored retaining the 
monarchy as a popular ideological symbol and 
as a means of attracting financial support, 
Phan Chu Trinh wanted primarily to abolish 
the monarchy in order to create a base on 
which to build national sovereignty•75 
Both Phan Boi and Phan Chu continued to work toward their 
respective goals for the next quarter century - no matter if 
they were free, in prison or in exile. 
It was Phan Boi's, not Phan Chu's, work which is 
considered to be immeasurable to Vietnamese independence. 
Although an advocate of much the same sentiment as Messali Hadj 
in Algeria, Phan Boi's failures were due to his inability to 
incorporate the peasantry into his revolution - which Hadj had 
accomplished (possibly because Hadj was part of that 
peasantry). 
His [Phan Boi] greatest weakness, according 
to many historians, was his failure to 
involve the Vietnamese peasantry, who 
composed 80 percent of the population, in his 
drive for independence. Rather than 
recruiting support at the village level, Phan 
Boi Chau and his followers concentrated on 
recruiting the elite, in the belief that the 
75.Ibid. 
peasant masses would automatically rally 
around the scholar-gentry. 76 
Future independence leaders would not make the same 
mistake. 
By the end of World War I the independence movement led by 
the scholarly elite began to temporarily fade. The French 
scaled back both imports and investments to Vietnam which 
opened the door for pro-French Vietnamese entrepreneurs. These 
entrepreneurs became "active in light industries such as rice 
milling, printing, and textile weaving."77 These people became 
pro-French but were, like the Evolues, frustrated by their 
inability to achieve certain demands that would bring them on 
even par with the French. They sought, among other things, 
higher pay for Vietnamese officials, reformation of the 
naturalization laws to make it easier for Vietnamese to become 
French citizens, and an end to the ethnic Chinese economic 
domination over Vietnamese in Cochin china.78 The entrepreneurs 
76.Ibid, 38. 
77.Ibid, 39. 
78.Note: The French sought out the Chinese to act as 
middlemen and the Chinese came to dominate rice trade and retail 
business in both urban and rural areas. 
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frustration, unlike the same encountered by the Evolues in 
Algeria, occurred earlier in the century and was not the 
springboard for the Vietnamese revolution. Yet, it shows again 
an increasing economic position for at least a segment of the 
society that follows the J-Curve model. 
Ho Chi Minh 
Ho Chi Minh, born in May, 1890, founded the Viet Nam Thanh 
Nien Cach Menh Dong Chi Hoi (Revolutionary Youth League) in 
1925 - Its members later became known as the Viet Minh. Ho took 
his revolutionary lessons from the Phan Boi philosophy; that 
is, expulsion of the French, not compromise with the French. Ho 
was a scholar from a poor peasant family. He was trained, 
naturally, in the Confucian tradition. In his adult years, 
however, his revolutionary interests took him deep into the 
throngs of people of Europe - especially into Russia and 
France. His indoctrination into communism while in Russia would 
be the impetus for his revolutionary work. Ho spent much of his 
time outside of Vietnam but built a following around his 
communist, and, ironically, nationalist, doctrine. 
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Ho's success began to develop between the two world wars 
when Vietnamese incomes and working conditions had begun to 
falter. 
...[S]ince the beginning of the century, 
working conditions and salaries had improved 
little. The number of strikes rose from seven 
in 1927 to ninety-eight in 1930. As the 
effects of the worldwide depression began to 
be felt, French investors withdrew their 
money from Vietnam...Although both French 
colons and wealthy Vietnamese landowners were 
hit by the crisis, it was the peasant who 
bore most of the burden because he was forced 
to sell at least twice as much rice to pay 
the same amount in taxes or other debts.79 
The depression and Ho's Leninist/nationalist teachings 
worked hand in hand to accomplish what Phan Boi could not - 
incorporate the peasantry into the independence movement. Ho 
drew much of his support from the villages and utilized them 
more extensively than the elite when the revolution began. By 
the time the Japanese withdrew after World War II, Ho would be 
the philosophical, if not material leader, of a great deal of 
Vietnam. 
In December 1946 the Vietminh was supported 
by the majority of the nation because, when 
it went to war against France, it carried on 
79.Ibid, 43. 
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a nationalist tradition which stretched back 
to Emperor Ham Nghi .80 
It wasn't until Ho dropped the nationalist disguise did any of 
his supporters abandon ship in favor of the French-backed 
regimes. 
Ho, however, was not a member of the elite. His revolution 
against the French incorporated the most economically deprived 
of the Vietnamese people. Most of the Vietnamese landed-gentry 
put their support behind such French-backed leaders as Ngo Dinh 
Diem. This indicates that this revolution is more in line with 
the Aspirational Deprivation model proposed by Gurr than 
Davies' J-Curve model. 
The Japanese occupation of Vietnam during World War II left 
void any real outside power to control the people. The Japanese 
were content to leave the administration of the country in the 
hands of the defeated French personnel - which remained the 
case until 1945 when the Japanese military position was quickly 
weakening and they evicted the French personnel and took over 
the operations of the country outright. 
80.Duiker, 139. 
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During the war Ho and his men worked closely with the 
allies to remove the Japanese from China in a quid pro quo that 
sought to ensure that after the war the French would not return 
and Vietnam would be independent. 
Following the war, to the objection of U.S. President 
Franklin Roosevelt, the allies felt a European occupancy was 
necessary in the country and allowed the British and French to 
resume control. The British essentially went along with the 
wishes of the French in nearly all areas of concern. Eventually 
the British relinquished any authority back to the French. 
As the Japanese withdrew. Ho found the perfect opportunity 
to set up his own independent government following the French 
removal by the Japanese during the war. "On September 2, 1945, 
in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh declared the independence of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam."81 
When the French returned. Ho Chi Minh had established his 
own government and a clash was inevitable. The revolution was 
upon Vietnam. 
It should be noted here that the nationalist's attempt in 
Vietnam never really subsided as it had in Algeria. France, 
81.Duiker, 135. 
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from its arrival through the time it left, was perpetually- 
putting down nationalist movements. This is surely due to the 
long and pride-filled history that many Vietnamese wished to 
maintain. 
Economics 
When the French arrived in Vietnam, they found a country 
quite literally opposed to economic progress and very much at 
the initial economic/values development point on the J-Curve. 
In the years 1800-1847 the... 
well-being of the nation still depended 
almost exclusively on the peasant and his 
rice field. And the Confucianist influence 
had become an insurmountable barrier to 
social and economic change, a bar to 
technological advance. So it was at a time 
when Vietnam seemed more powerful in Asia 
than ever before in its history, it proved 
less able to defend itself from foreign 
invaders. . .82 
France, from its outset, began to develop an unchanging 
and self-sufficient country into a modern economy. With this 
modern economy came a downward turn for many Vietnamese. Some 
were displaced, as in Algeria, to the newly developed urban 
centers created by France. Some had a hard time adapting to a 
82.Ellen Hammer. Vietnam: Yesterday and Today.(Holt. 
Rhinehart and Winston, Inc., New York, New York: 1966), 102. 
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system of profits, industry, and the Western legal system. The 
gap between rich and poor became accentuated with the 
introduction of Western financial systems. 
Many of the villages, which for centuries had kept to 
themselves behind their bamboo hedges, saw these very hedges 
being destroyed by governmental and financial controls. 
The process by which the gap between rich and 
poor widened was speeded up by the 
introduction of a modern capitalist economy 
into the country. The new importance of 
money, the emergence of the profit system, 
the introduction of the credit to tide the 
peasant over from one season to the next, the 
development of new economic activities under 
the French, and the colonial administration 
itself which recruited a certain number of 
Vietnamese to serve in its ranks all 
contributed to changes in the class 
structure.83 
The French did bring to Vietnam an enormous amount of 
modernization. The French introduced modern irrigation 
techniques into places like the Transbassac region of western 
Cochin China which greatly increased rice production (this rice 
was generally exported while many in Vietnam starved); they 
developed a system of roads and railroads (most notably the 
Transindochinese line). They also... 
83.Hammer, 121. 
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developed ports, reinforced and extended the 
dike system, and built extensive... drainage 
works. Public services like hospitals and 
schools were established, as were scientific 
and cultural research institutes. The 
Vietnamese population more than doubled under 
French rule, benefitting from an extended 
period of peace [no more clashes between 
rival monarchs and their claim to the throne] 
and from improvements in public sanitation 
and in the control of epidemic diseases.84 
Much like the case in Algeria, along with population 
displacement and cultural breakdown the French also brought 
with them economic development to these previously middle-age 
era countries. 
The development of Vietnam brought greater dividends to 
the French than the colonization of Algeria brought. The 
exploitation of Vietnam's resources earned the French great 
wealth in exports. The exports included rice (the production 
greatly elevated due to irrigation improvements introduced by 
the French), tea, coffee, rubber, coal, and zinc. 
To many Vietnamese, unlike the Algerians, they began to 
see the importance or utility of the economic progression. In 
Vietnam there were more people, especially the members of 
84.Ibid, 115-116. 
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the scholarly elite, who embraced these new technological and 
philosophical ideas. 
Vietnam's traditional society had limited 
knowledge of the modern world. Its Confucian 
tenets discouraged change and rejected the 
Western concept of progress. Once the door to 
modernization was open by the French, 
however, a multitude of new demands was 
released. The more Western ideas permeated 
society, the more changes were demanded. New 
education expanded horizons, increasing the 
desire for change, which in turn created more 
social dislocation.85 
Throughout Vietnam there were members of the elite who 
plunged into the Western ideas immediately upon the French 
arrival. Though their numbers were relatively few at the 
outset, those that did embrace these ideas found themselves in 
the position of large landowner, entrepreneur, or, in some 
cases as government officials helping to bridge the gap between 
the French administration and the populous. 
Thus the French identity was welcomed in certain circles 
can be verified. In two specific areas, education and language, 
the French made a significant impact on the Vietnamese. The 
traditional education system was not practical for any 
Vietnamese person who wished to move his country forward. And 
85.Bain, 20. 
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the Vietnamese more eagerly sought Western based education than 
the Algerians. 
One of the few things on which Vietnamese 
nationalists and their french rulers agreed 
was that the traditional education system was 
deficient both in substance and method. For 
many centuries this system had relied 
exclusively on the old Confucianist manuals, 
ignoring the natural sciences and mathematics 
-which were subjects necessary to the 
development of modern technology and 
economics.86 
The French also opened the lycees (elementary schools) in 
increasing numbers to Vietnamese children in Hanoi and Saigon. 
Many of those Vietnamese students who finished in these schools 
went to either the University of Hanoi or, in some cases, to 
Paris to complete their education. These schools were not open 
to the Vietnamese until the introduction of Quoc Ngu - "the 
Romanized script [of the Vietnamese language] first introduced 
in the seventeenth century"87 
Quoc Ngu was the means for introducing Vietnam to Western 
culture and ideals. It was a better tool than Chinese and 
conveyed ideals and the future tense more effectively and 
86.Hammer, 123. 
87.Ibid, 124. 
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efficiently than the characters of either Chinese or Vietnamese 
script. 
The contrast between the larger number of people who 
readily identified with these Western ideas and became 
economically successful in Vietnam with the smaller number who 
either did not, or could not, in the same time frame in Algeria 
places the two countries differently on the J-Curve. If the J- 
Curve holds, Vietnam would have seen a more rapid development, 
based on the evidence above, along the J-Curve. 
It should be noted, however, that the adaptation to 
Western ideals, principals, and language was not universal in 
the country. 
In contact with French culture, the grip of 
the old traditions and outlook on many 
members of the educated class was bound to 
weaken. However, it should be kept in mind 
that Westernization -- largely confined to 
the urban population -- was and still is, 
slow and superficial. In many instances it 
had simply the negative effect of 
discrediting the past, thus leaving a 
cultural vacuum which later was often filled 
by Communist doctrines.88 
Vietnamese access to positions within the French 
administration were not as open as they were in Algeria. In 
88.Bain, 102. 
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Vietnam the French chose to utilize either their own, home¬ 
grown personnel or ethnic Chinese in the job as go-between, or 
middle man, with the population. The French would have chosen 
to utilize the indigenous population for this role, as they had 
developed in Algeria, because the indigenous people understood 
better the needs, desires, and weakness of their own more so 
than an outsider. They could also communicate on the same 
level. In Vietnam, however, those most qualified to hold these 
positions (the scholarly elite) were more often than not on the 
side of anticolonialism and sought to restore Vietnam to its 
emperor-led feudal system. 
In summary, Vietnam was a static and self-sufficient 
country when the French arrived. Its economic progress was well 
behind Western measures and would place it at the initial point 
on the J-Curve. Though early efforts by nationalists were made 
to return to the precolonial system, many of the Western ideals 
and technologies were employed by later nationalists. There was 
a significantly larger portion of Vietnamese that found 
prosperity in the French system than had in Algeria. This 
segment of the population seems to have moved up the J-Curve at 
a much faster, more developed pace, than the Evolues had in 
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Algeria. At the same time displacement, cultural breakdown, and 
high taxation plagued the masses of people. 
Lastly, there was no significant economic development that 
triggered the revolution in Vietnam. The revolution was 
developing from the time the French arrived and found its 
window of opportunity with the developments of World War II. 
Chapter 4 
CONCLUSIONS 
Both Vietnam and Algeria were colonized countries in which 
the revolutions in these two countries overthrew the colonial 
powers. In James Davies' works the closest he comes to a study 
of this variety is that of the American Revolution. This is 
significant in several ways. First, the American Revolution was 
a conflict between people of essentially the same culture and 
language; the Algerian and Vietnamese Revolutions were fought 
by people of opposing cultures and language. Secondly, the 
Americans were, in all respects, the colonizers shedding the 
rule of the mother country; in Algeria and Vietnam it was the 
indigenous populations shedding the invading rulers. However, 
all three of these revolutions do share a common bond: all 
three groups sought to free themselves from an outside ruler 
and become independent. 
In Davies' other works, such as the French and Russian 
Revolutions, he deals with the overthrow of a domestic 
government by the citizenry. 
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The American Revolution is cited here because of the data 
Davies uses to apply it to the J-Curve. In his work on this 
revolution Davies never distinguishes between the economic 
development of the elite, landed class that led the revolution 
and the economic development of the masses in America. 
Actually, he does not purposely do so in any of his studies; it 
only becomes apparent in his Dorr's rebellion study because the 
rebellious group in that situation was small and homogeneous. 
In applying the data from the Algeria and Vietnam 
situations to the J-Curve there are two specific differences, 
and one similarity, that must be addressed. First, in each case 
there was overall economic development implemented by the 
French. In both countries the infrastructure was vastly 
improved with roads and railroads, education was developed 
along Western lines of philosophy and values, and health care 
was brought in that greatly improved the mortality rates 
resulting in exploding population growth. Secondly, and maybe 
most significantly, there was economic/value development on two 
separate levels in both countries. In Algeria, the E-volv.es were 
much more prosperous than the general population. In Vietnam, 
the scholarly elite from precolonial times continued to thrive 
and benefit from the French presence as the village population 
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continued in traditional ways - never really benefitting from 
the improvements and implementations. Third, Algeria and 
Vietnam were at the same point on the J-Curve when the French 
arrived as America was when British colonization began. 
Thus, in this study the populations must be studied with 
the two differences in mind - something Davies did not do in 
his American Revolution study. 
Algerian Findings 
Algeria was most definitely at the initial point on the J- 
Curve of mere survival when the French arrived. The population 
was one of tribes whose continued existence depended more on 
mother nature than on the feats of humans. 
The evidence from that moment forward does not show an 
economic upward trend for the indigenous population. The heavy 
displacement, taxation, and unemployment of the general 
population continued through the 1954 revolution. The rewards 
for the economic development most often went to the colons. 
Thus, the general population appears to be more in line with 
the Aspirational Deprivation model proposed by Gurr. The 
general population's value position never improves while at the 
same time they see their value expectations being achieved by 
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the colons and the Evolues (the beni-oui-ouis) . It is evident 
that their frustrations are channeled through revolutionary 
leaders such as Messali Hadj because he was not an evolues and 
spoke the same language as those that had been left behind in 
the development. 
The Evolues segment of the population shows a clear 
development along the J-Curve pattern. Their existence is tied 
to the general population up to the end of the nineteenth 
century. From that point forward they begin to achieve economic 
progression by securing administrative positions and jobs and 
educational opportunities in France. Their progression, though 
often thwarted by the colons, continued to move up as they 
achieved small concessions from the French government. Some of 
those achievements include the passage of the private-property 
code, financial autonomy from the French, and the Algerian 
Charter. These achievements, though often watered down, were 
value gains none the less. 
The downward turn on the curve occurs with failure of the 
Blum-Violette plan to become enacted. At this point the liberal 
efforts to work with the French are shunned by the population 
in favor of the conservative naitionalists that favored 
expulsion of the French altogether. 
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The revolution, it can be argued, could have been avoided 
if the French (and colons particular) had worked more 
diligently with the liberals and granted more of the demands 
put forth.(Of course, there are those who argue that the 
revolution was inevitable.) The French refusal to capitulate on 
one more demand - the Blum-Violette Plan - resulted in a 
revolution carried out not from the liberal position but from 
the conservative nationalists. 
The method Davies used to study the American Revolution, 
if applied to the Algerian case, would fit his model perfectly. 
However, the population's bi-level development suggests that 
both the J-Curve and Aspirational models are appropriate. 
Vietnam Findings 
As noted above Vietnam, though clearly ahead of Algeria in 
economic development when colonization began, was at the 
initial economic point when the French arrived, when one 
considers the development that was to come. 
Economic development for most Vietnamese never 
materialized. Most of the population, which inhabited the 
villages, never experienced a value improvement - if anything 
they experienced Progressive Deprivation with displacement and 
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cultural breakdown. The vast majority of the population held 
firmly to their Confucian-based principles and, one can 
surmise, never experienced a value expectation based upon the 
improvements brought by the French. If this segment of the 
population's economic development must apply to either model 
it, like the Algerian masses, would better fit the Aspirational 
deprivation model. However, their desire and determination to 
retain their centuries old subsistence and lifestyle suggest 
they experienced no value expectation that was not fulfilled. 
The elite class from Vietnam's feudal system evolved 
similarly to the Evolues with the exception that the elites of 
Vietnam were quicker to grasp the Western methods and did so 
more eagerly. Initially, the Vietnamese elite strove diligently 
to maintain the precolonial structure by rejecting Western 
ideas. But it wasn't long before they saw the benefits they 
could derive from those ideas in their own struggle. 
Part of the elite class sought the material benefits of 
this development and worked closely with the French. Their 
value expectations were fulfilled in the form of business 
ownership, government positions, and large-tract land 
ownership. This group worked diligently toward improving 
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Franco-Vietnamese relations in an effort to continue fulfilling 
increasing value expectations. 
The remaining, and larger portion, of the elite saw the 
Western ideals and progress brought in as a tool they could use 
to expel the French and strengthen their position in Asia. Many 
of the nationalist figures from the nineteenth century up to Ho 
Chi Minh used this framework to further their cause. 
Ironically, though they used the innovations the French 
brought, they never saw their own lot improve. Not because they 
were denied the opportunity; rather they held on to 
conservative, precolonial ideals that rejected Western 
cultural. This group, like the general population, would more 
appropriately fit the Aspirational model. 
There was no downward economic turn that triggered the 
Vietnamese Revolution. Its centuries old existence as an 
independent nation was a continual catalyst for the 
nationalists in their endeavor to oust the French colonizers. 
The trigger for this revolution, if one can be found, was the 
power vacuum left when the Japanese withdrew after World War 
II. This gave Ho Chi Minh the occasion to establish his own 
government which led to the confrontation with France in the 
ensuing revolution. 
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Both of these cases, if viewed from Davies' own method, 
could apply differently to the J-Curve and Aspirational models. 
If one only views the economic development of the country as 
value expectations being fulfilled, then the Algerian 
revolution would definitely fit the J-Curve model: there was 
economic, educational, and social development for the country 
as a whole and there was a downward turn in the ability to 
fulfill the needs satisfaction following the failure of the 
Blum-Violette Plan. From that point on the revolution began to 
develop into fruition. 
The Vietnamese Revolution, however, does not fit the J- 
Curve when viewed this way. Though economic and educational 
development prospered for the country as a whole, there was no 
downward economic turn that signaled an expectation that values 
achieved would be lost or furthered. 
Having done this study it appears to the author that 
Davies' vision of populations and their revolutions takes an 
exceedingly narrow approach by virtue of his methods. His 
studies of the economic development, save for Dorr's Rebellion, 
are broad and encompassing. In. the cases studied here the 
populations are bi-level in their ability to satisfy their 
needs expectations. Was this the case in the American 
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revolution? Further study of that revolution would be required. 
In summary, neither of the revolutions in this study fit 
the J-Curve nor the Aspirational model. The values achievement 
/expectations shows the general population of both Algeria and 
Vietnam during the colonial period to fit the Aspirational 
model. The Evolues of Algeria seem to fit the J-Curve model 
impressively. Lastly, the elite nationalists of Vietnam 
conform, though uncomfortably, to the Aspirational model. 
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